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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
guilty defendant moved successfully to have the charge prosecuted by indictment."'
The same grand jury returned a true bill upon the same counts as contained in the
information, but without hearing the evidence against defendant a second time.
Defendant sought reversal of his conviction because of this failure of the same
grand jury to recall the same witnesses who had previously testified before it, or
to have their testimony re-read. This is an issue of first impression before the
Court of Appeals.'
The grand jury had both the power and the duty to inquire into the conduct
of defendant.'0 An accused has the right to move to dismiss an indictment based
on illegal or insufficient evidence,17 but there is a presumption that the indictment
has been legally found until the contrary is shown.' 8 It has been held that a
superseding indictment is valid though certain witnesses were not reexamined
when both indictments were found by the same grand jury.19
In affirming the conviction the Court here held that "the grand jury might
have refused to indict and were empowered to indict at least for the same crimes
originally stated in the information." Analogizing the indictment replacing the
information here to the superseding indictment upheld in prior cases the Court
has established a point of law likely to withstand assail. It would be an obvious
absurdity to require the grand jury to rehear the very testimony it has once acted
upon. This is especially so in the absence of any showing that the defendant
was substantially injured.
Revocation Of Driver's License
Section 71 of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law makes revocation of an
operator's license mandatory upon the third speeding conviction within eighteen
months.
2 0
Section 335-a of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure provides that
magistrates, at the time of arraignment and before accepting a plea, must warn
all residents of this state charged with traffic violations that a plea of guilty is
14. N.Y. CITY CRIM. CTs. ACT §31(1) (c).
15. The same issue has been affirmed against a defendant, without opinion,
in People v. Wasserberger, I A.D.2d 952, 151 N.Y.S.2d 610 (1st Dep't 1956), and
People v. Gertner, 2 A.D.2d 960, 158 N.Y.S.2d 749 (1st Dep't 1956).
16. N.Y. CODE CiRur. PROC. §245; People v. International Nickel Co., 155 N.Y.
Supp. 156 (County Ct. 1914), a!I'd, 168 App Div. 245, 155 N.Y. Supp. 295 (2d Dep't
1915), aff'd, 218 N.Y. 644, 112 N.E. 1068 (1916).
17. People ex rel. Hirschberg v. Supreme Court of New York, 269 N.Y. 392,
199 N.E. 634 (1936).
18. People v. Sweeney, 213 N.Y. 37, 106 N.E. 913 (1914); People v. Feld,
305 N.Y. 322, 333, 113 N.E.2d 440, 445 (1953).
19. People v. Falasco, 121 Misc. 538, 201 N.Y. Supp. 275 (Sup. Ct. 1923); cf.
Commonwealth v. Clune, 162 Mass. 206, 213, 38 N.E. 435 (1894).
20. N.Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW §71(2) (c).
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equivalent to a conviction after trial, and that conviction may mean suspension or
revocation of the accused's operator's license.2 1
May a driver's license properly be revoked upon the third conviction for
speeding within eighteen months if at any one of the three arraignments the
magistrate failed to so warn the motorist? This question was before the Court
in two cases decided on the same day, with results varying according to the
circumstances.
In Hubbell v. Macduff, 22 the Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate
Division's order23 reversing dismissal by the Supreme Court at Special Term of
the petitioner's proceeding under Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Act
to annul the revocation by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles of his license and
remitting the matter to Special Term to ascertain whether or not the magistrate
had in fact given the required warning at the arraingment which led to the
petitioner's second conviction.
Rejecting the commissioner's argument that the warning need be given only
in that case which resulted in the third conviction, the Court declared that,
while such was the case under the law as it stood before July 1, 1953,24 the
amendment effective that date was designed to relieve the magistrate of the
necessity of speculating as to the consequences of a conviction in the case before
him and that it accomplished this by requiring a simple, uniform warning in
prescribed language to be given in every case of traffic violation whether or not
a revocation or suspension might be based upon it.25
21. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §335-a:
The magistrate upon the arraignment in this state of a
resident of this state charged with a violation of the vehicle
and traffic law, or other law or ordinance relating to the
operation of motor vehicles or motor cycles, and before
accepting a plea, must inform the defendant at the time of
his arraignment in substance as follows: A plea of guilty to
this charge is equivalent to a conviction after trial. If you
are convicted, not only will you be liable to a penalty, but
in addition your license to drive a motor vehicle or motor
cycle, and your certificate of registration, if any, are subject
to suspension and revocation as prescribed by law.
22. 2 N.Y.2d 563, 161 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1957).
23. Hubbell v. Macduff, I A.D.2d 407, 151 N.Y.S.2d 435 (4th Dep't 1956).
24. See, e.g., Johnston v. Fletcher, 86 N.Y.S.2d 690 (Sup. Ct. 1949), aff'd
mnern., 275 App. Div. 802, 88 N.Y.S.2d 915 (1st Dep't 1949), aff'd me2n., 300 N.Y.
470, 88 N.E.2d 657 (1949).
25. Before the 1953 amendment (N.Y. Sess. Laws 1953, c. 288) the section
read as follows: '
§335-a. Provisions applicable to arraignments for traffic
violations. The magistrate, after the arrest in this state of
a resident of this state charged with a violation of the
vehicle and traffic law, or other law or ordinance relating
to the operation of motor vehicles or motor cycles, and
lefore accepting a plea, must inform the defendant at the(Footnote continued on following page.)
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
But in Astman v. Kelly"- the Court held that, while it was error for the
judge in a trial on charges of speeding to omit to give the defendant the
prescribed warning, it was not, under the given circumstances, prejudicial error
and did not require annulment of the commissioner's order revoking the
defendant's license.
Astman was convicted of three speeding violations within a period of
eighteen months, and in each case pleaded guilty. In the first two cases he
received from the magistrate the prescribed warning before the pleas were
entered. In the third case the magistrate failed to give the warning at any
time. Shortly after the third conviction, upon which he was fined twenty-five
dollars, he requested and was granted permission to withdraw his plea of guilty
and enter a plea of not guilty in its stead. No reason for his request appeared in
the record. After trial, at which he was represented by counsel, he was found
guilty and fined the same amount. At no time in any of the proceedings leading
to this conviction was he given the prescribed warning. The Commissioner of
Motor Vehicles subsequently revoked his operator's license, and Astman thereafter
instituted a proceeding under Article 78 of the Civil Practice Act for a review of
the commissioner's action. The Appellate Division,2 - reversing an order of
Special Term, directed the commissioner to restore the motorist's license. The
Court of Appeals agreed with the Appellate Division's ruling that the requirement
of Section 335-a is not waived by the entry of a plea of not guilty, but held that a
failure to give the statutory warning will not invalidate a revocation of license
unless the omission was prejudicial. The Court declined to find that the petitioner
had been prejudiced in respect to a substantial right since he neither claimed
to have had an unfair trial nor pointed to any errors transpiring during the trial,
and since it appeared that he had been represented by counsel, that he had stated
(Footnote continued from preceding page.)
time of his arraignment that upon conviction, not only
will he be liable to a penalty, but that, in addition, his
license to drive a motor vehicle or motor cycle, or in the
case of an owner, the certificate of registration of his
motor vehicle or motor cycle, may or must be suspended
or revoked in accordance with the provisions of law
governing the charge involved, and must expressly inform
the defendant that a plea of guilty is equivalent to a
conviction after trial. (N.Y. Sess. Laws 1947, c. 418.)
After the amendment the section read substantially as set out in note 21.
supra. The opinion of the Appellate Division (Hubbell v. Macduff, supra note 23
at 411, 151 N.Y.S.2d at 439) states: "It is unfortunate that the draftsmen of the
amendment did not use more explicit language in expressing the legislative
intent. Nevertheless, in the light of the language used, the circumstances
under which it was enacted, and the difficulties of administration which were
sought to be eliminated, we conclude that the Legislature intended by the amend-
ment to provide a uniform warning in the form prescribed by the statute which
must be given in every case involving a violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law
or other laws or ordinances relating to the operation of motor vehicles.
26. 2 N.Y.2d 567, 161 N.Y.S.2d 860 (1957).
27. Astman v. Kelly, 1 A.D.24 449, 151 N.Y.S.2d 589 (4th Dep't 1956).
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he was "ready" when called for trial, that he had not been denied the right or
opportunity to produce witnesses, that the right of appeal was open to him, and
that the withdrawal of his guilty plea had not been used against him.
Although the Court avoids making the point, it is submitted that a factor
in reaching such a decision might well be the inference from circumstances that
the reason for the defendant's withdrawal of his plea of guilty was that he had
learned in the meantime that his license was to be revoked. If the inference
is supported by a record which shows a diligent conduct of the defense at trial,
then it could fairly be concluded that the statutory warning was in this case
unnecessary to achieve the objective obviously intended by the legislature in
prescribing it, i.e., to put the defendant on notice of the consequences that might
follow his conviction so that he might not enter a hasty or ill-considered plea of
guilty or be too casual in his defense at trial after a plea of not guilty.
Judge Van Voorhis dissented, arguing that, since the majority opinion
endorsed the rule that the requirement of section 335-a is not waived by the
entry of a plea of not guilty, and since the Court had in a previous case28 ruled
that the warning must be read regardless of whether the defendant is represented
by counsel, the mere combination of these two factors cannot convert the
character of the failure to read the warning from prejudicial to non-prejudicial
error.
It is submitted: (1) that the dissent lends support to the idea that the
majority gave more weight than is expressed in its opinion to the circumstance
that the record failed to show any reason for the defendant's withdrawal of his
plea of guilty, and (2) that Judge Van Voorhis is unwilling to mitigate the
effect of the failure to obey a "simple and imperative legislative enactment"'29 on
the basis of such inference.
Unlicensed Practice Of Law
In In; re RoePO, the accused was charged with violation of section 270 of
the Penal Law which provides that the practice of law without a license is
illegal.3 ' The defendant, a member of the Mexican Bar but not a member of
28. People v. Duell, 1 N.Y.2d 132, 151 N.Y.S.2d 15 (1956).
29. Astman v. Kelly, supra note 26 at 575, 161 N.Y.S.2d at 866.
30. 3 N.Y.2d 224, 165 N.Y.S.2d 31 (1957).
31. N.Y. PENAL LAW §270:
It shall be unlawful for any natural person to practice
or appear as an attorney at law ... or to hold himself out
to the public as being entitled to practice law aforesaid, or
in any other manner ... without having first been duly and
regularly licensed and admitted to practice law in the
courts of record of this state ....
